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We describe a methodology and standard of proof for experimental claims of quantum random
number generation (QRNG), analogous to well-established methods from precision measurement.
For appropriately constructed physical implementations, lower bounds on the quantum contribu-
tion to the average min-entropy can be derived from measurements on the QRNG output. Given
these bounds, randomness extractors allow generation of nearly perfect “-random” bit streams. An
analysis of experimental uncertainties then gives experimentally derived confidence levels on the 
randomness of these sequences. We demonstrate the methodology by application to phase-diffusion
QRNG, driven by spontaneous emission as a trusted randomness source. All other factors, includ-
ing classical phase noise, amplitude fluctuations, digitization errors and correlations due to finite
detection bandwidth, are treated with paranoid caution, i.e., assuming the worst possible behav-
iors consistent with observations. A data-constrained numerical optimization of the distribution of
untrusted parameters is used to lower bound the average min-entropy. Under this paranoid anal-
ysis, the QRNG remains efficient, generating at least 2.3 quantum random bits per symbol with
8-bit digitization and at least 0.83 quantum random bits per symbol with binary digitization, at
a confidence level of 0.99993. The result demonstrates ultra-fast QRNG with strong experimental
guarantees.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum random number generation extracts ran-
domness from quantum mechanical processes and mea-
surements. Processes used have included radioactive de-
cay [1], path-splitting of single photons [2], photon num-
ber path entanglement [3], amplified spontaneous emis-
sion [4], measurement of the phase noise of a laser [5–
8], photon arrival time [9], vacuum-seeded bistable pro-
cesses [10] and stimulated Raman scattering [11]. Quan-
tum random number generators are attractive because
their randomness can be linked to well-tested principles
of quantum mechanics, e.g. the uncertainty principle
[12], which guarantees a minimum amount of random-
ness in some physical quantities.
Physics plays an essential role in QRNG, not only at
the generation stage, but also when making claims of
randomness. While it is common to test generated data
against statistical test suites [13], these tests can only
identify nonrandomness, i.e., patterns in the output. For
fundamental reasons, statistical tests cannot confirm ran-
domness of finite sequences [14]. In contrast, physical
models can support a randomness claim, as we describe
in this work.
Trust plays a central role in contemporary discussions
of QRNG, as it does in quantum cryptography. Cryp-
tography employs trust models that define what parts of
a communication system are assumed to be understood,
in contrast to those that could be under the control of
an adversary. A strategy that trusts fewer parts of the
system places a lower burden on verification. In an ex-
treme of paranoia, “device-independent” (DI) strategies
∗ morgan.mitchell@icfo.es
distrust even the measurement devices employed by the
communicating parties [15–19]. The DI approach aims to
provide security against hardware-based attacks [20], and
some progress toward DI QRNG has been demonstrated
[21].
It is important to note that DI techniques aim to
guarantee considerably more than randomness. They
use loophole-free Bell inequality violations [15], or other
evidence for nonlocality [17, 18], in conjunction with
monogamy relations and the no-signaling principle to
guarantee that no other actor could be in possession of
a copy of the generated random numbers. This guaran-
tee has obvious security value and explains much of the
interest in DI quantum key distribution and DI QRNG.
In practice, however, loophole-free Bell inequality viola-
tions are experimentally difficult, and the demonstrated
rates are very low. A heroic experiment that still left
open the timing loophole produced 42 random bits in
1 month [21], 15 orders of magnitude slower than other
techniques [8, 22]. For the foreseeable future, practical
use of QRNGs will require verification. Moreover, many
randomness applications, e.g. Monte Carlo simulations,
have no reason to protect themselves against informa-
tion leakage and obtain no benefit from the additional
security of the DI approach.
Nearly all experimental claims of QRNG to date im-
plicitly or explicitly assume nonadversarial devices, with
varying degrees of trust in their sources [2, 3, 5–7, 9–
12, 22–28]. To take the best-known example, splitting
a single photon on an ideal 50:50 beam-splitter gives a
random direction to the photon, and this direction can
be measured to give one perfectly random bit. DI-grade
paranoia is not practical in this scenario; if the beam-
splitter transmission were under the control of an ad-
versary, she could determine every outcome. It is thus
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2necessary to verify the performance of the device. Un-
fortunately, most QRNG claims, indeed all that we are
aware of, leave important gaps in the verification. In the
beam-splitter example, a variety of classical effects could
steer the outcome: correlations in the photon source, in-
efficiency in the detectors, light entering the unused port
of the interferometer, sensitivity of the beam-splitter to
polarization, frequency, beam position, beam direction,
or any other variable that might fluctuate in the light
source, to name a few. Some of these effects, e.g. variable
detector efficiency [29, 30], have been accounted for, while
others have not. For continuous-variable (CV) QRNGs,
a category that includes the fastest devices, the account-
ing for noise and detection bandwidth has to date been
unrealistically optimistic. For example, it is often as-
sumed that digitization noise is independent of the quan-
tum noise being digitized [7, 31] or that detection systems
introduce no correlations [25, 32]. As we show in Sec. V,
these assumptions are unwarranted in real systems. Con-
cerning analysis, only a few experimental works [7, 8, 11]
quantify their performance using measures compatible
with modern randomness extraction (see Sec. II).
We propose a standard of proof for quality assurance
in QRNG, between the paralyzing “trust-nothing” para-
noia of the DI approach and the risky insouciance of
most QRNG demonstrations to date. We refer to this
as metrology-grade paranoia. The name notes the simi-
larity of the verification required for characterization of a
QRNG and the verification required to make a precision
measurement. Both practices assume that the system is
fundamentally understandable, but take a conservative
and rigorous approach to calibration and experimental
imperfections, i.e., to systematic errors. A modern preci-
sion measurement, e.g., of the transition frequency in an
atomic clock, will take into account a large variety of pos-
sible systematic errors and give a quantitative estimation
of their effect on the measurement result [33, 34]. Both
approaches burden the experimenter with understanding
and quantifying all relevant aspects of their system. The
success of similar approaches in precision measurement
reassures us that this burden is not unbearable.
We apply our approach to phase-diffusion QRNG [6, 7],
the fastest reported QRNG approach [8, 22]. We show
that the statistics of the measured output provide lower
bounds on the amount of quantum randomness contained
in the data stream, allowing the generation of -random
sequences and the assignation of confidence levels to the
purity of the randomness. We find that the claims for
pulsed phase diffusion survive metrology-grade paranoia,
and thus it is possible to have simultaneously a very high
bit rate and strong randomness assurance in a practical
system.
II. RANDOMNESS QUANTIFICATION
A perfect physical device is not required for near-
perfect randomness generation. Algorithms known as
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FIG. 1. (Color online) (Top) Schematic of phase-diffusion
QRNG. A single-mode diode laser is strongly current modu-
lated to produce a train of phase-randomized output pulses
with field strengths E(t). Interference of subsequent pulses
is performed with a Mach-Zehnder interferometer, consisting
of single-mode 2× 2 couplers (cpl) and a relative delay equal
to the pulse-repetition period τ . A photodiode (PD) converts
the output pulse powers into electrical current, which is am-
plified (amp) and converted to digital values with a digitizer
(dig). Either arm of the MZI can be broken to measure the
pulse amplitude in the other arm. (Middle) Time domain
recording of a short digitized sequence of p(i), the interferom-
eter output with interference (top, blue), and p(s) (middle,
red), and p(l) (bottom, beige), the outputs of the interfer-
ometer with only the short or long path open, respectively.
Data have been shifted to have equal baselines. (Bottom)
Histograms (scaled for equal height) for p(i) (wide, blue), p(s)
(left narrow, red), and p(l) (right narrow, beige). The wide
p(i) distribution arises from interference and resembles the
arcsine distribution that describes cosφ when φ is uniformly
distributed.
randomness extractors (REs) [14, 35] convert partly ran-
dom data into nearly perfect “-random” bit strings by
a hashing process [36]. If d is a random symbol with
probability distribution P (d), then P ≡ maxd P (d) is the
predictability, and H∞ ≡ − log2 P is the min-entropy.
Information-theoretically provable REs [14, 37] can pro-
3FIG. 2. (Color online) Measured digitization error frequen-
cies and error limits. Color indicates relative frequency from
zero (black) to maximum (white). It is interesting to note
the presence of both a large-scale nonlinearity in the con-
version (the general trend) and small-scale regularities (e.g.
the period-two patterns clearly visible between 50 and 60).
Green traces above and below indicate the largest and small-
est errors observed, respectively. Approximately 214 samples
per digitization value were used to obtain the frequencies, so
the confidence that a new event will fall within the limits is
≈ 1− 2−14.
duce -random output bit strings with a length given by
their input min-entropy.
Real devices do not operate under constant conditions,
and it is necessary to accommodate the possibility that
a QRNG is at some moments producing higher-quality
randomness than at other moments. We can describe
this situation saying the symbol d has a probability dis-
tribution P (d|x), where x describes the condition of the
source when d is produced. Although x may vary, it is not
a source of true randomness. It describes parameters not
trusted to be random; for example, the x variation may
be deterministic but unknown to us. We consider the ran-
domness quantification from the perspective of someone,
perhaps an adversary, who knows x. Because x includes
all of the untrusted variables, and because the trusted
variables are independent, subsequent d are independent,
in the sense that the probability P ({d}|{x}) of generat-
ing a string of output symbols {d} ≡ (d1, . . . , dN ) under
conditions {x} ≡ (x1, . . . ,xN ) is given by the product
P ({d}|{x}) = ΠiP (di|xi). The conditional min-entropy
of {d} is then
H∞({d}|{x}) ≡ − log2 min{d} P ({d}) =
∑
i
H∞(di|xi)
(1)
where H∞(d|x) ≡ − log2 mind P (d|x) is the conditional
min-entropy of a single symbol generated with conditions
x. Note that H∞({d}|{x}) does not depend on the order
of the elements of {x}, so that a knowledge of the relative
frequencies Frel(x) with which the conditions x appear
in {x} is sufficient to compute the mean min-entropy per
symbol,
H∞ =
∫
dxFrel(x)H∞(d|x). (2)
As we shall see, a measured string {d}, combined with a
model of how x and trusted randomness interact in the
source to produce d, constrain Frel(x), and thus provide
a bound on H∞ for that string. In this way, randomness
guarantees, with no prior assumptions about {x}, can be
generated, at the cost of analyzing each raw string {d}.
If we allow ourselves to assume that the conditions {x}
are independent random variables [38], it suffices to char-
acterize P (x), the distribution of x, rather than Frel(x),
the relative frequencies that actually occur. REs adapted
to this probabilistic situation [39, 40] give -random out-
put with length limited by the average min-entropy, de-
fined as
H˜∞ ≡ − log2
∫
dxP (x) max
d
P (d|x). (3)
Note the difference relative to Eq. (2); here the logarithm
is outside of the average. This reduces the entropy, so
that for P (x) = Frel(x), H˜∞ ≤ H∞. As with Frel(x) and
H∞, P (x) and H˜∞ can be bounded using knowledge of
a measured string {d}, but this calculation only needs to
be performed once, and can be performed with a very
long string {d}, to precisely estimate P (x).
In what follows, we work with P (x) and H˜∞, the more
conservative of the two entropy measures, although the
same methods can be applied to Frel(x) and H∞.
III. METHODOLOGY
In principle, the prescription for metrology-grade para-
noia is simple. First, describe the process by which a
quantum random variable, in our case φq, the laser phase
diffusion due to spontaneous emission, and other exper-
imental variables x combine to produces measurement
results d. Second, use the distribution of φq, known from
first principles or from modeling, to calculate P (d|x), the
distribution of symbols d, conditioned on x. Third, find
H˜∞, the lowest value of H˜∞ that is consistent with what
is known about x, i.e., with experimental or theoretical
constraints on P (x), the distribution of x.
Knowing H˜∞, a RE can then be used to produce an
-random bit string, with length ≈ NH˜∞, where N is the
number of symbols in the raw data string. Confidence in
the randomness of this bit string derives from the con-
fidence in P (x). For example, if statistical and system-
atic uncertainties give 99% confidence that the process
produced at least H˜∞ average min-entropy, then the ex-
tracted bit string is -random with at least that same
confidence level.
The consistency condition is an invitation to paranoia.
For example, it has sometimes been assumed in QRNG
work that digitization errors are independent of the quan-
tum signal being digitized, and simply add entropy to the
raw data, an entropy that is not of quantum origin and
must be accounted for in order to not overestimate the
quantum entropy, but is otherwise harmless. But is this
really the case ? How can one be sure that the noise
4added by the digitizer is independent of the signal ? Un-
less one possesses specific knowledge about this charac-
teristic of the digitizer in question, one must admit that
our knowledge is consistent with less favorable scenarios
[25]. For example, the digitizer might organize its errors
to bias the results toward one subset of possible symbols,
reducing the entropy and in effect consuming some of the
quantum randomness present. A paranoid analysis must
assume this is indeed happening, and in the way that
reduces H˜∞ as much as possible.
To show that this methodology can be used in practice,
we perform this analysis on a phase-diffusion QRNG, of
the same design as [8].
IV. MODEL
We start with the model shown in Fig. 1 (top), cor-
responding to [6, 8]. A single-mode diode laser is driven
with a strongly modulated injection current with period
τ . For all data shown in this work, τ = 5 ns. The optical
output of the laser, described by the field E(t), is fed to
the input of an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interfereome-
ter (MZI), with short and long delays τs and τl = τs + τ ,
respectively. The field exiting the MZI is
E1(t) = TsE(t− τs) + TlE(t− τl), (4)
where Ts and Tl are the transmission coefficients, in-
cluding both couplers, for the short and long paths, re-
spectively. A photodiode converts the incident power,
p(i)(t) = |E1(t)|2, into a current, which is amplified and
digitized at times ti = iτ , i = 1, 2, . . . with the time origin
chosen near the peak of the pulse. Due to strong phase-
diffusion between times ti and ti+1, the detected signal
shows a strong variation that is not present in the input
pulses. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 (middle), which shows
digitized signals, both from the complete MZI with inter-
ference, and from the MZI with either arm interrupted.
Histograms of the resulting interference and single-path
signals are shown in Fig. 1 (bottom).
The phase between pulses contains a quantum contri-
bution φ(q) as well as a classical contribution φ(c), due
to relative phase of the interferometer arms, as well as
classical fluctuations in laser parameters such as injec-
tion current. As described in the Appendix, quantum
theory of laser dynamics [41, 42] predicts that φ(q) is in-
dependently distributed from one pulse to the next, with
a Gaussian probability density function (PDF) P (φ(q))
of rms width σq. We keep σq as a parameter, in order to
study its effect on randomness generation. Writing the
total phase φ(c)(t)+φ(q)(t) = argE(t−τs)−argE(t−τl)
and suppressing time dependencies for clarity, the optical
signal, i.e., the instantaneous power, is
p(i) ≡ p(s) + p(l) + 2V
√
p(s)p(l) cos(φ(c) + φ(q)), (5)
where p(s)(t) ≡ |TsE(t − τs)|2, p(l)(t) ≡ |TlE(t − τl)|2,
and V(t) is the interference visibility. We assume the
photodetection and amplification process is linear and
stationary, so the electrical signal arriving to the digitizer
is
V (t) =
∫ t
−∞
dt′G(t− t′)p(i)(t′) + V (el)(t) (6)
where G is the impulse response of the detector-amplifier-
digitizer system and V (el) is the summed electronic noise
from all sources. Finally, the digitizer converts V to a
digital value d. Digitization is a highly nonlinear process,
and requires special care, as we now describe.
V. DIGITIZATION
Fig. 1 (bottom) illustrates a feature of digitization.
This process adds classical noise, e.g. from the ampli-
fication, and moreover employs a highly nonlinear elec-
tronic operation to convert a continuum of inputs p(i)
into a finite set of outputs d. Although it may be tempt-
ing to assume that errors in this process are independent
of p(i) (as is typically the case for amplifier noise), this
is clearly untrue for digitization noise. For example, a
digitizer will normally have a measurable preference for
even versus odd outputs [43], something that would not
occur if errors were independent of the input. In Fig. 1,
an oscillation in the histogram frequencies with period 4
is clearly visible, with an amplitude that is modulated
with a period of 16. These errors have an rms width of
0.8 codes, i.e., increments of the digitizer output, when
averaged over all d, and are clearly not independent of
p(i).
We experimentally bound the size of digitization er-
rors as follows. We use an electronic function generator
(Tabor WW1281A) followed by a low-pass filter to pro-
duce a quasistatic voltage (a 1-kHz triangle wave) and
digitize this signal with our fast 8-bit digitizer (Acqiris
U1084A) and simultaneously with a 14-bit oscilloscope
(Agilent infiniium 86100C with an electronic module Ag-
ilent 86112A) for reference. Fig. 2 shows the distribu-
tion of digitization errors, i.e., of the deviation of the
digitized value from the ideal value, based on ≈ 214 sam-
ples per digitization value. This allows us to identify
limits V
(min)
d and V
(max)
d , the minimum and maximum
voltages, respectively, that were observed to produce a
given digitization value d. Below, to compute a lower
bound on H
(Q)
∞ in the presence of digitization errors, we
assume that digitization results outside of these limits
are so improbable as to have a negligible effect on H
(Q)
∞ .
We note that electronic noise during the characterization
measurements, e.g., in the voltage source or in the refer-
ence oscilloscope, can only broaden these bounds, making
them conservative.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Normalized correlation and recovered
impulse response. The main graph shows autocorrelation ac∆
computed on a string of 108 symbols. Open blue (solid red)
circles indicate positive (negative) correlation. The horizontal
line shows sampling uncertainty. The inset shows the recon-
structed impulse response function Gj , as described in the
text.
VI. FINITE BANDWIDTH
Fig. 1 (middle) illustrates something intrinsic to ana-
log randomness generators. An ideal physical process
would produce independent random values, but this is
impossible in a real system due to bandwidth limitations.
When a digital sample is taken, the detection system is
still responding (possibly weakly) to analog inputs it re-
ceived at earlier times. This is evident in the upper trace
of Fig. 1, which visibly shows electronic ringing and does
not fully return to baseline after a strong pulse.
We model this behavior using Eq. (6), but considering
only the sampling times t = t1, t2, . . . and write Vi ≡
V (ti), Gj ≡ G(tj), etc.,
Vi =
∞∑
j=0
Gjpi−j + V
(el)
i (7)
We compute the autocorrelation ac∆ ≡ cov(Vi, Vi+∆) =∑
jkGjGkcov(pi−j , pi+∆−k) = var(p)
∑
j GjGj+∆, plus
a contribution from V (el), and we have assumed
cov(pi, pj) = var(p)δij . For our system, the V
(el) con-
tribution is negligible: var(V ) places an upper bound on
var(V (el)) for any input power p. Yet, if we interrupt
one arm of the interferometer, we observe nearly con-
stant signals V , as shown in Fig. 1, with variance 39 dB
below the variance of the interference signal. Because
ac∆ can be directly measured from the data, we have
an experimental determination of ac∆ ≡
∑
j GjGj+∆,
the autocorrelation of the impulse response. Consider-
ing that G0  Gj 6=0, and using the causality condi-
tion Gj<0 = 0, we find Gj perturbatively as follows.
We write Gj ≡
∑∞
n=0G
(n)
j λ
n, where λ is a parameter
that later is set to unity, and define the cross correlation
cc
(n,m)
∆ ≡
∑∞
j=0G
(n)
j G
(m)
j+∆. We write
ac∆ = λ
0 cc
(0,0)
∆ + λ
1
[
cc
(0,1)
∆ + cc
(1,0)
∆
]
+λ2
[
cc
(0,2)
∆ + cc
(1,1)
∆ + cc
(2,0)
∆
]
+ . . . , (8)
and solve by orders in λ from the starting condition
G
(0)
j ∝ δ0,j . Considering the λ0 contribution we find
cc
(0,0)
∆ = [G
(0)
0 ]
2δ0,∆ giving the λ
0 solution [G
(0)
0 ]
2 = ac0.
Without loss of generality we take G
(0)
0 to be posi-
tive. Considering then λ(1), we solve ac∆ = cc
(0,0)
∆ +[
cc
(0,1)
∆ + cc
(1,0)
∆
]
, a linear equation for G
(1)
j , by matrix
inversion. Continuing in a similar fashion for higher or-
ders in λ, Gj rapidly converges to give the impulse re-
sponse shown in Fig. 3. Considering the low degree of
observed correlation, it is not surprising that this resem-
bles the correlation ac∆ and is dominated by the ∆ = 0
term. It is perhaps interesting to note the narrow neg-
ative feature at ∆ = 10, probably due to an electronic
reflection in the cabling of the digitization electronics.
The net contribution of previous pulses is V
(prev)
i =∑i−1
j=−∞ pjGi−j . This contributes to the variance of in-
dividual Vi without adding any randomness to the se-
quence. From the di sequence we find bounds ζ− ≡
mini V
(prev)
i = −0.0145 full scale, or -3.7 codes at 8-bit
resolution, ζ+ ≡ maxi V (prev)i = 0.0156 full scale, or +4.0
codes at 8-bit resolution. We refer to ζ− and ζ+ as “hang-
over errors” for their delayed nature.
VII. REFINEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Having established a model for the device, we now
ask the following: Trusting only φ(q) to be random, how
much randomness exists in the output string ? In par-
ticular, we do not trust p(s), p(l),V, φ(c), V (el), or V (prev)
to be random. Fluctuations in these quantities can be
traced to fluctuations of classical variables, for example,
the injection current of the diode, that certainly contain
patterns, and that could, in principle, be described by a
perfectly deterministic pattern unknown to us. We are
not, however, completely ignorant about these quantities;
their distributions are constrained by the digitization and
correlation measurements described above, as well as by
the distributions of d(i), d(s), and d(l).
A key observation is illustrated by Fig. 1 (bottom).
The distributions of d(s) and d(l) are very narrow, whereas
the distribution of d(i) is broad. Provided the digitization
gives a not-too-unfaithful conversion from p to d, we con-
clude that p(i) varies much more than p(s) or p(l). By Eq.
(5), this implies V 6= 0, at least for some fraction of the
measured pulses. V 6= 0 in turn means that p(i) (and thus
d(i)) contain some randomness from φ(q). Our goal is to
make quantitative this observation, to put lower bounds
on the quantum randomness of the string {d(i)i }.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Illustration of the distribution func-
tion Fσq (p
(i)|x) that characterizes p(i) given by Eq. (5) for
fixed p(s), p(l), φ(c), and normally distributed φ(q). (Left) Vi-
sualization of the calculation. Gaussian P (φ(q)) (radial co-
ordinate) centered at φ(c) (polar coordinate), has probabil-
ity mass (green area) given by the error function between
limits given by the arccosine of the scaled and shifted p(i)
(horizontal coordinate). (Right) Illustration of Fσq (p
(i)|x) for
p(s) = p(l) = 51, V = 0.7, σq = pi/8, and φ(c) = 0, pi/8, . . . , pi,
from left to right.
VIII. DIGITIZATION LIMITS
An ideal digitization process would output the value
d ∈ [0, N−1] for inputs in the range p ∈ [p(ideal)d,− , p(ideal)d,+ ),
where
p
(ideal)
d,− ≡
{ −∞ d = 0
d otherwise
(9)
p
(ideal)
d,+ ≡
{ ∞ d = N − 1
d+ 1 otherwise
(10)
We have seen, however, that our digitizer sometimes
makes errors; i.e. it outputs a value d when p /∈
[p
(ideal)
d,− , p
(ideal)
d,+ ). The distribution of these errors is il-
lustrated in Fig. 2, and can be roughly characterized
by the rms width ≈ 0.8 codes. Defining p(dig)d,− and
p
(dig)
d,+ as the minimum and maximum inputs, respec-
tively, that are seen to give rise to an output d, we can
say with confidence that an output d implies an input
p ∈ [p(dig)d,− , p(dig)d,+ ). This also allows us to bound the prob-
ability P (d) of an output d. Given a cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) F (p) for the input, the output
satisfies P (d) ≤ F (p(dig)d,+ )− F (p(dig)d,− ).
We can include also errors due to finite bandwidth in
this description. If the minimum and maximum hang-
over are ζ− and ζ+, respectively (cf. Sec. VI), then
a value d implies p ∈ [p(d+h)d,− , p(d+h)d,+ ), where p(d+h)d,± =
p
(dig)
d,± + ζ± (the superscript
(d+h) indicates the combined
effects of digitization and hangover errors). These digiti-
zation limits including hangover will be used to evaluate
digitization of the strongly varying signal p(i), while the
limits without hangover will be used for the weakly vary-
ing p(s) and p(l), for which the hangover error is negligible.
IX. POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTIONS
For given x ≡ (p(s), p(l),V, φ(c)), and with φ(q) nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and rms width σq, we
can compute Fσq (p
(i)|x), the CDF for p(i), as follows. We
note the transformation of variables rule: If Y = f(X),
where f is a differentiable function and X is a random
variable with distribution PX(X), then the distribution
of Y is
PY (Y ) =
∑
i
∣∣∣∣ ddY f−1i (Y )
∣∣∣∣PX(f−1i (Y )) (11)
where f−1i (Y ) indicates the i’th root of the equation
f(X) = Y . Applied to Eq. (5) and integrating to find
Fσq (p
(i)|x) from Pp(i)(p(i)), we find
CDFσq (p
(i)|x) = 1− 1
2
∞∑
n=−∞
erf
φ− φ(c) + 2pin
σq
√
2
∣∣∣∣∣
φ=φdet
φ=−φdet
,(12)
φdet ≡ arccos p
(i) − p(s) − p(l)
2V
√
p(s)p(l)
(13)
where erf is the error function. This result is illustrated
in Fig. 4. The CDF has the usual interpretation: The
probability to find p(i) in an interval [a, b) is Fσq (b|x) −
Fσq (a|x).
We are also interested in the case where φ(q) + φ(c)
is completely uncertain, or equivalently uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 2pi). This gives
F◦(p(i)|x) ≡ 1− 1
pi
Re[arccos
p(i) − p(s) − p(l)
2V
√
p(s)p(l)
], (14)
which not surprisingly is the σq →∞ limit of Fσq (p(i)|x).
Finally, for the non-interfering signals p(s) and p(l), the
relevant CDF is
F|,s(p|x) ≡ θ(p− p(s)), (15)
F|,l(p|x) ≡ θ(p− p(l)), (16)
where θ is the Heaviside step function. Given a CDF
F (P |x) and a distribution P (x) for x, the statistically
averaged CDF is
F (p) =
∫
d4xF (p|x)P (x). (17)
The p(i) digitization frequencies of Fig. 1 were collected
with φ(c) varying due to thermal expansion of the fiber
loop in the MZI, and probably several other factors. This
causes a drift by much more than 2pi over the time of the
acquisition, so it is appropriate to compare the p(i) data
against F◦(p(i)), which incorporates the φ(c) averaging.
If we write P (s)(d), P (l)(d), and P (i)(d) for the probabil-
ities of digitization outcome d when measuring variable
p(s), p(l), and p(i), respectively, then the probability of an
7outcome in the range l to h is P
(s)
l,h ≡
∑h
d=l P
(s)(d) and
similar for P
(l)
l,h and P
(i)
l,h. P
(i)
l,h is upper bounded by
P
(i)
l,h ≤ F◦(p(d+h)h,+ )− F◦(p(d+h)l,− ), (18)
where [p
(d+h)
d,− , p
(d+h)
d,+ ) is the range, including errors as
described above, of the digitization outcome d. We
can also obtain a lower bound, considering that Pl,h =
1−P0,l−1 −Ph+1,N−1, and that the latter two terms are
upper bounded as above. We find
P
(i)
l,h ≥ F◦(p(d+h)h+1,−)− F◦(p(d+h)l−1,+). (19)
As both P (d)(i)and the limits pd,−, pd,+ have been mea-
sured, Eqs. (18) and (19) provide experimental con-
straints on P (x).
Analogous constraints apply to the noninterfering sig-
nals
P
(s)
l,h ≤ F|,s(p(dig)h,+ )− F|,s(p(dig)l,− ) (20)
P
(s)
l,h ≥ F|,s(p(dig)h+1,−)− F|,s(p(dig)l−1,+) (21)
and similar for P
(l)
l,h.
X. RANDOMNESS QUANTIFICATION REDUX
We now find a lower bound for H∞, as in Sec. II, but
including worst-case considerations for digitization and
hangover errors. As above, we first consider a given
x, implying a given Fσq (p
(i)|x). Inclusion of digitization
and correlation errors leads to the upper bound
P (i)(d|x) ≤ Fσq (pd,−|x)− Fσq (pd,+|x). (22)
In contrast to p(s), p(l), and V, which are more-or-less
directly reflected in {di} and thus have distributions con-
strained by, e.g., Eq. (18), we have little measured infor-
mation about φ(c). To be conservative, we maximize the
right-hand side over this variable to find the “worst-case”
(wc) bounds
P (i)(d|x) ≤ max
φ(c)
[
Fσq (pd,−|x)− Fσq (pd,+|x)
]
≡ P (wc)(d|x). (23)
Now maxd P
(wc)(d|x) upper bounds the predictability of
a single symbol, produced with a given x. For a string
of symbols, generated as x varies with distribution P (x),
the average min-entropy is lower bounded by Eq. (3) ap-
plied to P (wc)(d|x):
H˜∞ ≥ − log2
∫
dxP (x) max
d
P (wc)(d|x) ≡ H(wc,P (x))∞ .
(24)
0
0.21
0.29
pHsL
0.24
0.30
pHlL
1
V
0
0.22
0.27
pHsL
0.25
0.29
pHlL
1
V
FIG. 5. (Color online) Optimized piecewise-constant distribu-
tion P (x) for 8-bit digitization and σq = 3pi/2. Axes indicate
p(s), p(l), and V; density indicates si. φ(c) is not included as
an independent dimension because it is chosen according to
other criteria (see text). The ranges of p(s) and p(l) are cho-
sen to cover the whole range of these variables allowed by the
measured distributions shown in Fig. 1, in light of digitization
errors from Fig. 2. The graphic on the left uses worst-case
errors (green curves in Fig. 2); the one on the right uses error
limits narrower by a factor 0.275. Within these ranges, the
space is divided into a uniform 8×8×32 rectangular grid {ξi},
and corresponding weights {si} are calculated by numerical
minimization of the min-entropy lower bound as in Sec. XI.
The probability is concentrated in regions of high visibility,
necessary to agree with the wide measured distribution, and
regions of low visibility, which give low min-entropy. The dis-
tributions of p(i), p(s), and p(l) that follow from these P (x) are
shown in Fig. 6.
XI. OPTIMIZATION
Our goal is now to minimize H
(wc,P (x))
∞ , or equivalently
to maximize
P(wc) ≡
∫
dxP (x) max
d
P (wc)(d|x) (25)
by choice of P (x), subject to constraints as in Eqs.
(18)–(21). This will give a conservative estimate of con-
tribution of φ(q) to the min-entropy in the digitized
bit string. We transform this into a linear program-
ming problem by splitting the x space into a cover-
ing by nonoverlapping regions {χi}. If Rχi(x) ≡ 1
for x ∈ χi and zero otherwise, then the probability to
find x ∈ χi is si ≡
∫
d4xRχi(x)P (x). By assumption∫
d4xRχi(x)Rχj (x) = 0 for i 6= j.
Inserting the identity
∑
iRχi(x) in Eq. (25) we find
P(wc) =
∫
d4x
∑
i
Rχi(x)P (x) max
d
P (wc)(d|x) (26)
≤
∑
i
∫
d4xRχi(x)P (x) maxx∈χi
max
d
P (wc)(d|x)(27)
=
∑
i
si max
x∈χi
max
d
P (wc)(d|x) (28)
≡ P(wc,{si,χi}) (29)
As described below, the maximization over x ∈ χi in Eq.
(27) makes the coarse-graining procedure conservative.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Comparison of measured frequencies
against their most conservative interpretation, the prediction
from the optimized P (x). (Top) Prediction from P (x) of
Fig. 5 (left), assuming worst-case tolerances. (Bottom) Pre-
diction from P (x) of Fig. 5 (right), assuming tolerances 0.275
of worst case. The main graph shows a histogram of ob-
served p(i) (jagged blue), and vertically offset p(s), p(l) (inset,
left blue and right red), the same as in Fig. 1. Superposed
smooth green curves show the predicted distribution P (p(i))
computed from P (x) chosen to minimize H
(wc,{χi})
∞ . The in-
set shows, inverted, the predicted distributions for p(s) and
p(l). The predicted distributions are consistent with the ob-
served data in light of the tolerances provided by digitization
and hangover errors (see Secs. V and VI). Note the central
bump, from to low-visibility parts of the distribution, that
lowers the min-entropy.
The probabilities si are constrained by
∫
d4xP (x) = 1
or ∑
i
si = 1. (30)
An additional set of constraints, also linear in the {si},
is generated from Eqs. (18)–(21) by applying the coarse-
grained average
P (x)→
∑
i
siRχi(x), (31)
to Eq. (17), to give
F (p)→
∑
i
si
∫
d4xF (p|x)Rχi(x), (32)
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Min-entropy bound as a function
of σq for rectangular-lattice coverings of different resolution.
Digitization is 8 bits. With n(1 × 1 × 4) divisions, where
n = 6, . . . , 12, giving the shown curves, from bottom to top.
The inset shows the same curves on a finer scale. Increasing n
gives an increasing lower-bound for H∞: The inevitable error
due to finite covering resolution works to reduce H∞, making
the estimate conservative. With n = 8 we find 1% accuracy
relative to n = 12, the highest resolution we could optimize
using the MATLAB function linprog and 8 GB of RAM.
describing the various F quantities appearing in Eqs.
(18)–(21). In what follows, the χi are chosen to be rectan-
gular regions of x space, which facilitates the necessary
integrations. For example,
∫
dV F◦(p(i)|x) has an ana-
lytic form, reducing the number of numerical integrals.
Having expressed the constraints and objective func-
tion as linear functions of the si, we use a large-scale
linear programming routine to find the unique solution
{si} that maximizes P(wc,{si,χi}) subject to the set of
constraints, for a given covering {χi}. We arrive to the
bound
H˜∞ ≥ − log2 max{si} P
(wc,{si,χi}) ≡ H(wc,{χi})∞ . (33)
Illustrations are given in Figs. 6 and 5. We increase
the resolution, i.e., increase the number of elements in
the covering while decreasing their volumes, to reach our
best estimate of H
(wc,{χi})
∞ . Because the target function
H
(wc,{χi})
∞ is calculated using the worst point in each re-
gion, as in Eq. (27), while the constraints are calculated
using the region average, as in Eq. (31), the average
min-entropy bound increases with increasing resolution,
making the procedure conservative at finite resolution.
See Fig. 7 for illustration.
The statistical analysis described here can, in principle,
be performed on the raw data themselves, i.e., applied to
the symbols {d} prior to randomness extraction. Fur-
thermore, the analysis uses only the frequencies of the
symbols and is independent of their order. For these rea-
sons, there is no reason P (x) must be stationary in time.
Rather, it describes the distribution of x aggregated over
the time of the data acquisition.
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Lower bound on min-entropy versus
σq for different digitization resolution, from 1 bit to 8 bit
(bottom to top). Other conditions are: covering resolution
(p(s), p(l),V) = 8× 8× 32, “worst-case” assumptions for digi-
tization and hangover errors.
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Lower bound on min-entropy ver-
sus error tolerance at σq = 3pi/2 and covering resolution
(p(s), p(l),V) = 8 × 8 × 32. Hollow orange circles show 8-
bit digitization (on left scale), filled green circles show binary
digitization (on right scale). Error limits for a given d are
computed using the data shown in Fig. 2, plus the hangover
errors ζ± for p(i) digitization, and are interpolated between
the mean and the worst-case limits by the error tolerance
shown here on the horizontal axis. For error tolerance below
0.275 and with this covering, no P (x) is consistent with the
distributions shown in Fig. 1.
XII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We apply the above analysis to the QRNG described
in [8], based on the data shown in Figs. 1, 2, and 3. To
apply the analysis, we need a value for σq, which we take
to be σq = 3pi/2, well into the plateaux seen in Fig. 8.
Previous works describing the same system [6, 8] describe
a rapid phase diffusion, reaching σq > 3pi after a diffu-
sion time of 0.17 ns. Our 5-ns diffusion time is 29 times
longer, and thus σq = 3pi/2 is very conservative. The
results of [8] are based on modeling of the laser dynamics
(see also the Appendix), supported by direct experimen-
tal observations of the pulses. By considering systematic
uncertainties in the laser parameters, and statistical un-
certainties in the observations, it would, in principle, be
possible to place a confidence level on the assertion that
σq ≥ 3pi/2. In this case, however, we can see no rea-
sonable scenario in which the phase diffusion is so much
slower (at least a factor of 58) than calculated; the ex-
perimental results of [8] would have been dramatically
different in that case.
Fig. 8 shows H
(wc,{χi})
∞ , the lower bound on the
average min-entropy, as a function of digitization res-
olution. We find a lower bound of 2.3 quantum ran-
dom bits per symbol with 8-bit digitizationy-, and 0.83
quantum random bits per symbol with binary digitiza-
tion. Constraints are computed as above, from the 8-bit
characterization measurements, and we compute lower-
resolution digitizations by splitting the range p(i) ∈ [0, 1)
into N = 2b equally spaced bins. We assume worst-case
digitization and hangover errors as in Sec. VIII. The re-
sults show a roughly linear increase in H
(wc,{χi})
∞ versus
b until saturation around b = 6. This supports the in-
tuitively reasonable conclusion that resolution finer than
the scale of the digitization errors contributes little to
H
(wc,{χi})
∞ .
The above results are obtained with a high degree of
statistical confidence. As described in Sec. V, we use as
our error limits the most extreme errors seen in 214 sam-
plings for any given digitization output. We thus have a
confidence level of 1 − 2−14 ≈ 0.999939 that any given
digitization event will be within our limits and thus is
properly accounted for in computing the average min-
entropy. For hangover errors, due to a larger data set,
this confidence is ∼ 1 − 10−8. It will surely be reason-
able to consider less conservative error bounds for some
applications. We define a fractional error tolerance η
as follows: Recall that p
(ideal)
d,± and p
(d+h)
d,± are the min-
imum (−) and maximum (+) values that can give rise
to a symbol d in the ideal and error-adjusted cases, re-
spectively. Corresponding limits with scaled errors are
p
(d+h,η)
d,± ≡ ηp(d+h)d,± + (1 − η)p(ideal)d,± . In Fig. 9 we show
H
(wc,{χi})
∞ versus σq for different η, showing up to 3.5
quantum random bits per symbol in 8-bit digitization,
and up to 0.947 quantum random bits per symbol for
binary digitization.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
Establishing the randomness of data generated by a
physical process is a vexing challenge, with important
consequences for data security and stochastic simula-
tions. While many experiments have generated data
that in some way reflected the randomness of quantum
physics, many applications require both full random-
ness and realistic assurances of randomness. We have
described a methodology and experimental standard of
proof for quantum randomness, similar to the methodol-
10
ogy of precision measurement.
The methodology is paranoid in the sense that it as-
sumes the worst case behavior for all untrusted variables.
As in precision measurement, it is possible to place ex-
perimental constraints on the behavior of these variables
using auxiliary measurements and the generated data
themselves. A constrained numerical optimization of the
distribution of untrusted variables gives a lower bound
for the average min-entropy, the measure of randomness
appropriate to randomness extraction. This enables the
generation of nearly perfect -random bit strings. A con-
fidence level, also paranoid, is assigned to the average
min-entropy estimate, and thus to the -randomness of
the generated string.
We apply the method to an ultrafast phase-diffusion
QRNG, and find the system is an efficient randomness
generator even under this paranoid analysis. The result
shows that strong experimental guarantees can be given
for quantum random number generators.
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Appendix A: Phase diffusion in diode lasers
The dynamics of a diode laser are described by a set of
stochastic differential equations that govern the exchange
of energy between the charge carriers (electrons) and the
field, driven by the injection current I, with noise added
from spontaneous emission and spontaneous loss of elec-
trons. We reproduce the equations from Agrawal [41].
Other formulations [42] have similar global properties:
P˙ = (GL/
√
1 + p− γ)P +Rsp + FP (t) (A1)
φ˙ =
α
2
(GL − γ) + β
2
GLp
1 +
√
1 + p
+ Fφ(t) (A2)
N˙ = I/q − γeN −GLP/
√
1 + p+ FN (t). (A3)
Here P is the number of photons, φ is the phase of the
intra-cavity field and N is the number of charge carri-
ers. FP (t), Fφ(t), and FN (t) are δ-correlated zero-mean
Langevin noise terms, giving diffusion coefficients
DPP = Rsp, Dφφ = Rsp/(4P ), DPφ = 0
DNN = RspP + γeN, DPN = −RspP, DNφ = 0.
(A4)
Here Rsp is the rate of spontaneous emission, which de-
pends on N , while γe is the decay rate of the carrier
population. The other variables describe laser character-
istics that are not important in this discussion. Note that
all of the noise terms are traceable to two spontaneous
processes: the spontaneous emission of photons Rsp and
the spontaneous loss of carriers γeN , both of which give
rise to δ-correlated noise. The dynamics are invariant
under a global change of φ.
If we write the dynamical equation for φ as φ˙ = A +
Fφ(t), we can formally integrate to find ∆φ, the change
in φ over one pulse cycle ∆φ =
∫
dtA(t)+
∫
dtFφ(t). The
former term is a contribution to φ(c), and may depend
on, e.g., experimental variations in the current I. In
contrast, the latter term is φ(q), the phase diffusion due
to spontaneous emission. As the integral of white noise,
φ(q) is a Gaussian random variable. This conclusion is
not sensitive to the details of the model. Rather, it is
a consequence of our separation of the phase dynamics
into φ(q), the part driven by spontaneous emission, and
the part driven by everything else. We do not estimate
the amount of diffusion here, rather we leave this as a
parameter, to study the relationship of phase diffusion
to min-entropy generation, as in Figs. 7 and 8.
From the phase invariance of Eqs. (A1) – (A3), sub-
sequent realizations of φ(q) are independent. The phase
invariance is a possible weakness or point of attack on
the implementation. If an adversary could introduce a
coherent field at the laser frequency, they could bias the
laser toward a chosen phase. This attack appears diffi-
cult, however, as there is no optical connection to the
outside world; all optical fibers terminate either on a
photodetector or on an optical absorber. In addition,
in the implementation used here, an optical isolator in-
corporated into the laser package allows light to leave the
laser, but not to enter it.
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